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Abstract—Time-of-use (ToU) pricing is widely used by the
electricity utility. A carefully designed ToU pricing can incentivize
end-users’ energy storage deployment, which helps shave the
system peak load and reduce the system social cost. However,
the optimization of ToU pricing is highly non-trivial, and an
improperly designed ToU pricing may lead to storage investments
that are far from the social optimum. In this paper, we aim
at designing the optimal ToU pricing, jointly considering the
social cost of the utility and the storage investment decisions
of users. Since the storage investment costs are users’ private
information, we design low-complexity contracts to elicit the
necessary information and induce the proper behavior of users’
storage investment. The proposed contracts only specify three
contract items, which guides users of arbitrarily many different
storage-cost types to invest in full, partial, or no storage capacity
with respect to their peak demands. Our contracts can achieve
the social optimum when the utility knows the aggregate demand
of each storage-cost type (but not the individual user’s type).
When the utility only knows the distribution of each storage-
cost type’s demand, our contracts can lead to a near-optimal
solution. The gap with the social optimum is as small as 1.5%
based on the simulations using realistic data. We also show that
the proposed contracts can reduce the system social cost by over
30%, compared with no storage investment benchmark.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and motivation
Time-of-use (ToU) pricing is widely used by the electricity
utility to shave the system peak load and reduce the system
cost [1]. With ToU pricing, the utility divides one day into two
or three fixed time periods. For example, in two-period ToU
pricing, the utility sets a higher electricity price for the peak
period (e.g., 4PM to 9PM) and a lower price for the off-peak
period (e.g., 10PM to 3PM) [2].
The price difference between the peak and off-peak periods
provides incentives for end-users’ energy storage deployment,
which can reduce their electricity bill [3]. Users with storage
can purchase more electricity (by charging the storage) during
the off-peak hours with a lower price. During the peak hours,
users can discharge the storage to serve the demand with less
electricity consumption from the utility at the higher price.
The increasing deployment of energy storage at end-user
side, however, poses new challenges for the ToU pricing
design. On one hand, a proper ToU pricing can incentivize
users to invest in storage and reduce their energy cost, which
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can further shave the system peak load and reduce the social
cost (compared with no storage investment). On the other
hand, if the ToU pricing design does not consider the storage
impact and sets the price difference too high, it may incentivize
too much storage investment and create a new and even higher
system peak load. For example, if all the users invest in
storage and shift the demand from the peak period to off-
peak period, the original peak period will have zero demand
while the original off-peak period will become the new peak.
Furthermore, such an excessive storage investment may not
be good for the social welfare, as some users may have high
storage investment costs.
The above considerations motivate us to study the following
problem: How should we design the ToU pricing to benefit
users who invest in storage and achieve the social optimum
that jointly considers the utility’s supply cost and the users’
storage investment costs? Notice that users can choose
different storage products with different technologies, hence
users can have heterogeneous storage costs. To reach the social
optimum, we need to incentivize more users with low storage
costs to invest in storage while discouraging users with high
storage costs from investing. However, users’ storage costs
are often their private information, which poses challenges for
the ToU pricing design. To solve this problem, we will use
contract theory to elicit necessary information of users and
induce the proper storage investment behavior.
B. Related work
There have been a substantial amount of works on designing
ToU pricing for the utility. Chen et al. [4] offered optimal
contract options of ToU pricing to households, which both
minimizes the system peak load and maximizes the utility’s
profit. Ko¨k et al. [5] studied optimal ToU pricing with the
renewable energy investment. However, these works did not
consider the possible impact of end-users’ storage investment.
There are also works that studied the optimal storage
operation and investment under ToU pricing. Nguyen et al.
[6] optimized the operation of energy storage to minimize the
users’ cost under ToU pricing. Carpinelli et al. [7] proposed
a probabilistic method to size the storage under ToU pricing.
However, the ToU pricing is exogenously given in these works
without considering the storage’s impact on the system. So
far, there is no literature studying the design of ToU pricing
considering the end-users’ storage investment.
In the ToU pricing design, we adopt contract theory to deal
with users’ private storage costs. Contract theory has been
widely used in power systems as the mechanism for energy
or service procurement. Most of the studies focused on the
optimal contract for maximizing the payoff of the provider.
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For example, Tavafoghi et al. [8] designed an optimal contract
of energy procurement for a strategic electricity seller. Haring
et al. [9] proposed a contract that incentivizes users to offer
demand response services. Some works also considered the
contract for other objectives. Chen et al. [4] designed contracts
for ToU pricing, which also considered minimizing the system
peak load. However, the study in [4] focused on numerical
solutions without theoretical optimality guarantee.
Different from existing studies, our study aims to analyti-
cally design effective yet simple contracts that minimize the
social cost. The works [8] [9] designed a different contract
item for each type of agents. However, in our work, we only
need to design at most three common contract items for all
types of users. This significantly reduces the complexity of the
contract and makes it much more implementation friendly.
C. Main results
Our work focuses on the optimal contract design of the
ToU pricing and end-users’ storage investment, which aims to
minimize the system social cost. The main contributions and
results of this paper are listed as follows.
• Storage-aware ToU pricing: To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first work to analytically study the social-
optimal ToU pricing design, considering the end-users’
storage investment. The increasing storage deployment at
the end-user side requires a new design of ToU pricing
to maximize social welfare.
• Optimal contract design: It is challenging to optimize
the ToU pricing with private user storage costs. We adopt
contract theory to solve this problem, and only utilize the
aggregate demand information of each type of storage
cost. We analytically design two simple yet effective
contracts TS-C and TS-I, under the complete and in-
complete demand information of types, respectively. For
an arbitrary number of types with diverse storage costs,
we only need three contract items for each contract.
• Contract performance: We prove that Contract TS-C can
achieve the social optimum when the utility knows the
aggregate demand of each type. Based on realistic-data
simulations, we show that even when the utility only
knows the distribution (but not the exact value) of each
type’s demand, Contract TS-I can still lead to a near
social optimum with a 1.5% gap with the social optimum.
• Benefits of contract: Via realistic-data simulation, we
show that Contract TS-I can reduce the social cost by
over 30%, compared with a ToU pricing that provides
low incentives and leads to no storage investment.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider one electric utility serving a group I =
{1, 2 . . . I} of users (e.g., residential users and business users).
Figure 1 illustrates two timescales of decision making. At
the beginning of an investment horizon of D days (e.g., D
corresponding to many years), the utility announces the ToU
pricing contract to users and users decide how much to invest
in storage. The investment horizon is divided into operational
horizons. Each operational horizon corresponds to one day,
which is further divided into two periods T ={p, o} with peak
1 2 3 ... D
Off-peak Peak
Days
periods
 Investment horizon                 
 Operational horizon     -Utility annouces the ToU contract. 
-Users decide the storage investment.
Users operate the storage
Fig. 1. Two timescales.
period p and off-peak period o. On each day, each user utilizes
storage to minimize his electricity cost. Next we will introduce
the detailed models of the ToU pricing, users, and utility.
A. ToU pricing
We consider a two-period ToU pricing1 commonly used by
utilities [2], which is announced once and is valid for the
entire investment horizon. For example, the peak period can
be set from 4PM to 9PM and the off-peak period can be from
10PM to 3PM [2]. We assume that there are Hp hours for
the peak period and Ho hours for the off-peak period, where
Hp+Ho = 24. The electricity prices of the peak and off-peak
periods for user i are ppi and p
o
i , respectively. The peak price
is no smaller than the off-peak price, i.e., ppi ≥ poi . Notice that
we allow the utility to charge different users different prices.
B. Users
Users face the ToU pricing from the utility. Based on ToU
pricing, users can invest (at the beginning of the investment
horizon) and operate the storage (every day) to shift the
demand. For each user i, we denote his total demand in the
peak period (of a single day) as Dpi and the demand in the
off-peak period (of a single day) as Doi . We assume that each
user’s demand pattern is the same across different days for
analysis tractability.2 Because of this, we do not need to use
day index for the demands.
Next, we first explain the storage cost and electricity bill
of users, and then we formulate and solve the user’s cost
minimization problem.
1) Storage cost: At the beginning of the investment hori-
zon, each user i decides the invested storage capacity ci. The
unit capacity cost of storage for user i is θi per day, where we
scale the total investment capacity cost of the entire investment
horizon into one day.3 Note that different users can choose
different storage products with different technologies, hence
users have heterogeneous private storage costs. User i’s total
storage cost per day is θici.
2) Electricity bill: Next, we calculate the daily electricity
bill for users considering the storage deployment. During each
day, in the off-peak period, if user i purchase si amount
1In practice, both two-period and three-period ToU pricing exist. We focus
on the two-period pricing since it can already leverage the storage’s impact,
and we leave three-period case as future work.
2In the more realistic case, a user’s demand will vary across days; such a
general modeling will significantly complicate our analysis and hence will be
left for future work.
3We can evenly divide the total capital cost by the number of days of the
investment horizon considering zero annul interest rate. We also provide a
scaling method with the annul interest rate in the online appendix [10].
of energy from the utility and charge the storage,4 the total
electricity consumption from the utility will be Doi + si. As
a result, in the peak period, the total consumption from the
utility will be Dpi − si ≥ 0.5 All the energy charged into
the storage during the off-peak period will be discharged to
serve demand in the peak period. Therefore, at the beginning
of the off-peak period of the next day, the initial energy
level of storage is zero. Then, user i’s daily electricity bill
is ppi (D
p
i − si) + poi (Doi + si). We consider 100% charge
and discharge efficiency in our model, and we will generalize
results to non-100% efficiency in the future journal version.
3) User’s cost minimization problem: Each user wants to
minimize his total cost, which includes the electricity bill
and the cost of storage investment (scaled into one day). If
users are only charged based on the ToU pricing specified in
Section II.A, then each user i’s cost minimization problem
is formulated in Problem UCM. Each user i decides the
invested storage capacity ci over the investment horizon and
the charged energy si in the off-peak period each day (where
si does not change over different days).
Problem UCM: User i’s Cost Minimization
min ppi (D
p
i − si) + poi (Doi + si) + θici
s.t. 0 ≤ si ≤ ci, (1)
si ≤ Dpi , (2)
var : ci, si.
Constraint (1) ensures that the charge and discharge energy si
is within the storage capacity ci. Constraint (2) prevents the
negative demand of the user during the peak period.
We solve Problem UCM in Proposition 1. We let p∆i denote
the price difference between the peak price and off-peak price,
i.e., p∆i , p
p
i − poi .
Proposition 1 (Optimal solution to Problem UCM). The
optimal solution to Problem UCM is as follows,
• If θi < p∆i , c
∗
i = s
∗
i = D
p
i .
• If θi > p∆i , c
∗
i = s
∗
i = 0.
• If θi = p∆i , c
∗
i can be any value in [0, D
p
i ], and c
∗
i = s
∗
i .
We will show the proofs of all mathematical results in the
online appendix [10]. Proposition 1 shows that users’ optimal
storage investment decision has an all-or-nothing property.
When the storage cost θi is smaller than the price difference
p∆i , user i will invest in the storage capacity equal to his peak
demand Dpi , which is also the charge and discharge energy
of the storage. However, if the storage cost θi is higher than
the price difference p∆i , no storage will be invested. Note that
this optimal solution is derived under a simplified model of
fixed demand across days. However, it can already capture the
4The payment in ToU pricing is based on the total consumed energy in
peak and off-peak periods, without considering demand variation across hours.
Thus, we only let the total charged and discharge energy be si. We assume
users’ charge and discharge of storage across hours within peak and off-peak
periods can be regulated by the utility [11], so as to smooth the system load.
5We do not consider the negative demand in the current model, i.e., we do
not allow users to sell back energy from the storage to the utility [11].
impact of ToU pricing on users’ storage investment decisions.6
C. Electricity Utility
The utility bears the energy supply cost of satisfying users’
demand. We consider a quadratic supply cost, which is com-
monly used for thermal power plants [5]. Usually, the hourly
energy, e.g., kWh or MWh, is used to represent the power
assuming the constant power within one hour. The supply cost
for power pt in hour t is given by g(pt) = αp2t + βpt + γ,
where the coefficients α > 0, β > 0 and γ > 0 are based on
practical measurements, such as in [12]. Notice that the power
consumption here are aggregated from all users.
Based on the quadratic supply cost, we approximate the
power of the peak period and off-peak period (with multiple
hours) by average energy per hour in these periods, respec-
tively. For example, for the peak period of 12 hours with total
demand 12 MWh, we use an average demand of 1MW per
hour.7 Then, for the peak period, if the actual total demand is
Lp in the system, then the power of each hour is approximated
by Lp/Hp. The total peak period’s supply cost gp is then
gp(Lp) =
α
Hp
(Lp)2 + βLp + γHp. (3)
Similarly, the total supply cost for the demand Lo in the off-
peak period is
go(Lo) =
α
Ho
(Lo)2 + βLo + γHo. (4)
III. BENCHMARK: SOCIAL OPTIMUM
We assume that the regulated utility aims at minimizing
the system social cost [4], which includes users’ storage costs
and the utility’s supply cost. In this section, we first study
a benchmark where the utility as a social planner directly
decides the optimal investment and operation of storage in
the system, which will be later used in Section IV to compare
with our contracts. In the benchmark, we will first describe
different users types according to different storage costs. Then,
we formulate and solve the social-cost minimization problem
assuming the utility knows the aggregate demand of each type.
A. Type model
We assume a set of K = {1, 2 . . . ,K} storage types with
different costs in the market. The storage cost of type k is
denoted by θk. Multiple users having the same storage cost
belong to the same storage type. We rank the storage types
with an increasing order of the storage costs, i.e., θ1 < θ2 <
· · · < θK . Note that the utility does not need to know an
individual user’s storage cost.
We assume that the utility can estimate the aggregate
demand for each storage type, e.g., through surveys among
users, historical data of storage incentive program [11], or
market share of different storage products [14]. We denote
the aggregate daily peak demand and off-peak demand for
6In reality, considering each user’s varying demand across days, the
threshold structure in Proposition 1 will still hold, although the threshold
will depend on the demand distribution. We will generalize the results to the
varying demand across day in the future journal version.
7Based the realistic load data of 40 users [13], the supply cost under average
energy approximation has a small gap of less than 7% with the actual supply
cost computed based on actual energy consumption per hour. This motivates
us to consider the simplified average energy consumption model.
storage type k by Dk,p and Dk,o, respectively. We consider
the following two settings, depending on how much the utility
knows the information of each type’s demand.
• Complete demand information: The utility knows each
storage type’s aggregate demands at the beginning of the
investment horizon.
• Incomplete demand information: The utility does not
know the exact aggregate demands of each storage type,
but knows the distributions of the demands, at the begin-
ning of the investment horizon.
Next, we will consider two benchmarks of social cost
minimization problem under complete demand information
and complete demand distribution of types, respectively.
B. Social cost minimization
1) Complete demand information: We minimize the social
cost in Problem SCM as below, where the utility as a social
planner decides the optimal aggregate storage capacity ck and
charge and discharge energy sk for all users of each type k.
The social cost includes the storage investment cost∑
k∈K θ
kck (scaled into one day), the supply cost gp in
the peak period, and the supply cost go in the off-peak
period. The actual aggregate demand in the off-peak period is∑
k∈K(D
k,o + sk) due to the the charged energy
∑
k∈K s
k of
all types, and the actual aggregate demand in the peak period is∑
k∈K(D
k,p−sk) with the discharged energy. The constraints
follow the same structures as those in users’ problem UCM,
and we just replace the individual users with types.
Problem SCM: Social Cost Minimization under Complete
Demand Information
min
∑
k∈K
θkck+gp
(∑
k∈K
(Dk,p−sk)
)
+go
(∑
k∈K
(Dk,o+sk)
)
s.t. 0 ≤ sk ≤ ck,∀k ∈ K, (5)
sk ≤ Dk,p,∀k ∈ K, (6)
var: sk, ck,∀k ∈ K.
Problem SCM is a quadratic programming problem. We
will later characterize the structure of its optimal solution.
2) Incomplete demand information: For the incomplete
demand information, we model the peak and off-peak demands
of each type k by random variables Dk = (Dk,p, Dk,o).
We focus on the joint distribution of all types’ demand. We
let D = (D1, D2, . . . , DK) in sample space D denote the
joint random variable of peak and off-peak demand of all
types. In the benchmark, we consider the ideal case that the
social planner can decide the optimal storage investment and
operation for each realizationD. This serves as a lower bound
of the best performance for our contract. We formulate the
expected social-cost minimization problem in Problem ESCM.
Problem ESCM: Expected Social Cost Minimization under
Incomplete Demand Information
Symb := min ED
[∑
k∈K
θkck(D)+gp
(∑
k∈K
(Dk,p−sk(D))
)
+ go
(∑
k∈K
(Dk,o + sk(D))
)]
!"∗
Class ℱ Class % Class&!"∗:0
!"∗: (",*
Fig. 2. Illustration of three classes.
s.t. 0 ≤ sk(D) ≤ ck(D),∀k ∈ K,∀D ∈ D, (7)
sk(D) ≤ Dk,p,∀k ∈ K,∀D ∈ D, (8)
var : ck(D), sk(D),∀k ∈ K,∀D ∈ D.
Clearly, Problem ESCM can be decoupled into subproblems
for each realization D, which is equivalent to Problem SCM.
The expected minimum costs of all these realizations will lead
to the optimal objective value of Problem ESCM. Thus, we
will just focus on Problem SCM and analyze it in next part.
C. Solution structure of social cost minimization
The optimal solution to Problem SCM divides storage
types into three classes in terms of different users’ storage
investment behaviors. We show the three-class structure in
Proposition 2, and present the detailed optimal solution to
Problem SCM in the online appendix [10].
Proposition 2 (Three classes of storage types). The optimal
solution of Problem SCM divides all storage types into three
classes, which are denoted by sets F , P , and N , respectively.
The storage costs in Class F are smaller than the storage costs
in Class P , which are in turn smaller than those in Class N .
• Class F: Users of each type k ∈ F fully invests in an
aggregate storage capacity equal to the aggregate peak
demand, i.e., ck∗ = Dk,p,∀k ∈ F .
• Class P: There is at most one storage type in set P , i.e.,
| P |≤ 1. Users of this type partially invests in the aggre-
gate storage capacity, i.e., it is strictly positive but strictly
smaller than the peak demand, 0 < ck∗ < Dk,p,∀k ∈ P .
• Class N : Users of each type k ∈ N invests in no storage,
i.e., ck∗ = 0,∀k ∈ N .
Each of the class can be an empty set, with the constraint
that | F | + | P | + | N |=| K |.
Proposition 2 classifies storage types into three classes in
terms of different optimal storage investment decisions (that
are centrally determined in the benchmark). Note that multiple
users may belong to the same type. If user i belongs to type k
and type k is in any class F , P , or N , we call that user i is
of class F, P , or N , respectively. Inspired by the three-class
structure, we next design contracts to guide the three classes of
users to invest in storage following the social-optimal solution.
IV. CONTRACT DESIGN
We have introduced the benchmarks of social optimum,
where the utility directly decides the aggregate storage in-
vestment for users of each type. In practice, however, users’
storage costs are private information and they will not let the
utility determine the storage investment on their behalf. Hence,
we will design contracts for the utility to incentivize users.
We will design two contracts, where Contract TS-C achieves
the social optimum for the complete demand information of
types, and Contract TS-I achieves near social optimum for the
incomplete demand information of types
A. Contract design: Complete demand information
For the complete demand information of types, we will first
introduce the contract and then characterize the conditions to
ensure that the contract can reach social optimum.
1) Contract items: We will design Contract TS-C with
three classes (i.e., items), and each item has two parameters:
the peak and off-peak price difference of ToU pricing, and
the constraint on each user’s storage investment. The three-
item contract is motivated by the social optimum benchmark
in Proposition 2. The two parameters are chosen according
to the discussions in Proposition 1 of users’ problem, where
users’ storage investment decision depends on the comparison
between the price difference and the storage cost. Next we
introduce the contract in detail.
Recall the utility knows the aggregate demand of each
type under complete demand information. Then, based on the
solution the benchmark Problem SCM, the utility knows the
optimal aggregate storage investment of each type, and which
type belongs to which class. However, the utility does not
know which individual user belongs to which class. Therefore,
we design the contract to incentivize users to reveal the class
information. Specifically, for each user of class x ∈ {F, P,N},
we design the corresponding contract item (p∆x , ηx). The
parameter p∆x is the price difference of ToU pricing.
8 The
parameter ηx is the maximum ratio of a user’s invested storage
capacity to his peak demand, computed as follows We let type
b be the only type in class P , if P is non-empty.
• ηF = 1: Each user i is required to invest in storage
capacity no greater than his peak demand Dpi .
• ηP = cb∗/Db,p ∈ (0, 1): Each user i is required to invest
in storage capacity no greater than ηPD
p
i .
• ηN = 0: Each user is not allowed to invests in storage.
We summarize the design of Contract TS-C as below. Next,
we characterize the conditions of the price difference p∆x ,∀x ∈
{F, P,N} in Theorem 1 so as to ensure the social optimum.
2) Social-optima conditions: We show in Proposition 3 that
the contract should satisfy two requirements to reach social
optimum: (i) Each user only selects the contract intended for
his class; (ii) Users corresponding to each contract item invest
in storage capacity at the maximum ratio ηx, x ∈ {F, P,N}.
Proposition 3 (Social-optimum requirement). Contract TS-C
achieves the social optimum if it induces users’ behaviors that
satisfy both Requirements (i) and (ii).
These two requirements will let the storage investment and
operation of all users coincide with the social optimum. Next,
we discuss how to achieve such two requirements in detail.
8Note that each contract item specifies only the price difference p∆ but not
the peak price ppi and off-peak price p
o
i . We assume that the utility can set
the peak and off-peak prices for each user i in such a way that, if the user
does not invest in storage, his payment is the same across all contract items,
i.e., ppi,FD
p
i + p
o
i,FD
o
i = p
p
i,PD
p
i + p
o
i,PD
o
i = p
p
i,ND
p
i + p
o
i,ND
o
i , where
ppi,x (p
o
i,x) denotes the peak (off-peak) price for user i in class x. As a result,
only the price difference affects the user’s selection of contract items.
Contract TS-C: Contract for ToU pricing and storage invest-
ment under complete demand information
1: Information: The utility knows the information of each
type’s aggregate demand.
2: Classification: The utility solves Problem SCM and di-
vides storage types into three classes F , P and N , as
stated in Proposition 2.
3: Contract items: The utility designs and announces three-
item contract: (p∆x , ηx), ∀x ∈ {F, P,N}:
• ηF = 1, ηP = cb∗/Db,p, ηN = 0.
• p∆x , ∀x ∈ {F, P,N} satisfying Theorem 1.
Requirement (i) is known as Incentive Compatibility (IC) in
Definition 1. We denote the cost of user i after choosing the
contract item for class x as pii(p∆x , ηx). Later we can show that
our contract is always feasible even with such strict inequality.
Definition 1 (Incentive Compatibility). A contract is incentive
compatible if user i of class x ∈ {F, P,N} minimizes his cost
by choosing the contract intended for his class, i.e., for any
y ∈ {F, P,N} and y 6= x, pii(p∆x , ηx) < pii(p∆y , ηy).
We choose the strict inequality in Definition 1 to ensure that
a user always chooses the contract item intended for his class
without any ambiguity. We can achieve Requirement (i) by
satisfying Definition 1.
We can achieve Requirement (ii) if we let the price dif-
ference be strictly larger than user i’s storage cost θi who is
expected to invest in storage. This is implied by the all-or-
nothing property in Proposition 1.
Then, in Theorem 1, we characterize the conditions on the
price difference p∆ such that Contract TS-C satisfies both
Requirement (i) and (ii). Here, recall we use type b to denote
the only type in class P (if P is non-empty). We let Type a
be the type with the highest storage cost θa in class F , and
Type c be the type with the lowest storage cost θc in class N .
If class F does not exist, we just set p∆F = +∞ and θa = 0.
If class P does not exist, we set ηP = 0 and replace θb by
θc. If the class N does not exist, we set θc = +∞.
Theorem 1 (Social optima conditions). Contract TS-C
achieves the social optimum, if and only if the price difference
of each contract item satisfies all the following conditions:
• p∆F : ηP θ
b + (1− ηP )θa <p∆F< (p∆P − θb)ηP + θb.
• p∆P : θ
b <p∆P < min
(
θc, p∆F /ηP − θa(1− ηP )/ηP
)
.
• p∆N : p
∆
N ≥ 0.
Furthermore, there always exist p∆F , p
∆
P , and p
∆
N that satisfy
the above conditions.
The conditions in Theorem 1 ensure that Requirement
(i) and (ii) are satisfied. Theorem 1 suggests that the price
difference cannot be too higher or too lower. Intuitively, a
price difference that is too high (e.g., p∆F > (p
∆
P −θb)ηP +θb)
may incentivize users to choose other classes’ contract items
(e.g., a class-P user may choose the class-F contract item),
and a price difference that is too low cannot incentivize users
to invest in enough storage. As long as the price difference
p∆x ,∀x ∈ {F, P,N} satisfies the conditions in Theorem 1,
the contract will reach the social optimum. Due to the IC
requirement, the conditions of p∆F and p
∆
P are coupled with
each other. However, with the strict inequality of storage costs
of types, i.e., θa < θb < θc, conditions in Theorem 1 are
always feasible.
B. Contract design: Incomplete demand information
In Section IV.A, we have designed a social-optimal Contract
TS-C with complete information of each type’s aggregate
demand. When the utility only knows the distribution of such
demands, we will also propose a three-item contract: Contract
TS-I, which may not always achieve the social optimum of the
benchmark Problem ESCM. We will evaluate the performance
of the contract via the performance ratio with the benchmark.
1) Contract design: In Contract TS-I, we will still fix
the three-class classifications across types. We first decide
the optimal partition of the three classes F , P and N by
minimizing the expected social cost based on the demand
distribution of types. Then, we design the contract following
the same way as the case of complete demand information.
Specifically, recall that we let type b be the only type in class
P . For each type k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , b− 1}, we let the investment
ratio ηk = ηF = 1. For each type k ∈ {b+ 1, b+ 2, . . . ,K},
we let the investment ratio ηk = ηN = 0. We denote the
investment ratio of type b by ηb. The utility decides the optimal
type b ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} in class P and the optimal ratio ηb ∈
[0, 1) to minimize the social cost as in the following Problem
ESCM-C. The optimal ratio ηb will be later set as ηP in the
contract. Note that we let ηb ∈ [0, 1] instead of ηb ∈ (0, 1) to
ensure the feasibility of Problem ESCM-C. If ηb = 0 or 1, it
will mean that there exists no class P .
Problem ESCM-C: Expected Social Cost Minimization
with Contract under Incomplete Demand Information
Symc := min ED
[
K∑
k=1
θkηkDk,p+gp
(
K∑
k=1
(Dk,p−ηkDk,p)
)
+ go
(
K∑
k=1
(Dk,o + ηkDk,p)
)]
s.t. ηk = 1,∀k ≤ b− 1, (9)
ηb ∈ [0, 1], (10)
ηk = 0,∀k ≥ b+ 1, (11)
var :b ∈ K, ηb ∈ [0, 1].
Compared with the benchmark Problem ESCM, Problem
ESCM-C fixes the three classes of types independently of
demand’s realization. Thus, there is a gap in the social cost
between Problem ESCM-C and Problem ESCM.
Based on the solution to Problem ESCM-C, we design
Contract TS-I following the way of Contract TS-C. The only
difference between Contract TS-I and Contract TS-C is that
the utility solves Problem SCM in designing Contract TS-C,
while solving Problem ESCM-C in designing Contract TS-I.
We show the detail of Contract TS-I in the online appendix
[10]. Furthermore, we show in Theorem 2 that Contract TS-I
achievs the optimal solution of Problem ESCM-C.
Theorem 2 (Optimality of Contract TS-I). Contract TS-I
achieves the optimal solution of Problem ESCM-C.
Then, it only remains to solve Problem ESCM-C. Problem
ESCM-C is a mixed integer quadratic programming. We solve
it by an exhaustive search over the boundary types, which
is efficient since we only compare K results. We show the
detailed algorithm in the online appendix [10].
2) Performance metric: We evaluate Contract TS-I perfor-
mance based on the ratio κ, which is the ratio between the
social cost induced by Contract TS-I and the minimum social
cost of the benchmark Problem ESCM, i.e.,
κ =
Symc
Symb
. (12)
Recall that Symb is a lower bound of the social optimum
under incomplete demand information of types and thus κ ≥ 1.
When κ is closer to 1, Contract TS-I performs closer to the
social optimum. In the next section, we will use the real data
to construct the demand distribution, and we show that the
ratio κ can be very close to 1 in practice.
V. SIMULATION RESULT
We have shown that for types’ complete demand informa-
tion, Contract TS-C achieves the social optimum. For the
incomplete demand information, we will further show Con-
tract TS-I’s performance by constructing the type’s demand
distribution using the realistic data of users’ load and solar
energy. We show that Contract TS-I can lead to the social
cost that is very close to the benchmark Problem ESCM.
A. Setup
1) Load profile: Based on the Austin Data set [13], we pick
hourly load and solar energy generations of 40 (households)
users in one year (with valid data of 361 days). In Figure 3(a),
we show the aggregate energy profile with seven randomly
picked days in one year, where the blue curves and red curves
represent the aggregate loads and solar energy generations,
respectively. In Figure 3(b), we show the aggregate net load
(load minus solar energy)9 of seven randomly picked days in
blue curves, with the mean value computed based on the entire
year’s data in green curve. We construct the users demand
distribution based on their net loads profiles of the entire year.
2) Peak and off-peak periods of ToU pricing: Based on the
average net load of all users in Figure 3(b), we empirically
set the peak period from 18:00 to 00:00 (7 hours), and the
off-peak period from 01:00 to 17:00 (17 hours).
3) Storage cost: We consider 4 storage types with the cor-
responding (daily) investment costs of [θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4]=
[
θ¯(1−
1.5λs) , θ¯(1− 0.5λs), θ¯(1 + 0.5λs), θ¯(1 + 1.5λs)]. The mean
value of the storage costs is θ¯. The coefficient λs indicates the
diversity of storage costs among types.10 We scale the storage
cost for years evenly into one day, ranging from 2 $/MWh (for
CAES) to 130 $/MW (for Tesla Powerwall). In simulations,
9We let users curtail the surplus renewable energy in simulations.
10Storage costs can be very diverse. According to [15], the compressed-air
energy storage (CAES) has the cheap capital cost about 53-84$/kWh with the
lifespan of 20-100 years. The Lithium battery’s cost can be high. Typically,
Tesla Powerwall’s price is 6500$ for 13.5 kWh with the warranty of 10 years.
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Fig. 3. (a) Aggregate load /solar energy; (b) Aggregate net load.
we randomly group 40 users into 4 types, and calculate the
mean of 1000 such random groupings of storage types.
B. Performance of the proposed contract
Based on the empirical net-load data, we will show that
Contract TS-I leads to social cost that is very close to the
benchmark Problem ESCM, and such a contract significantly
reduces the social cost compared with no storage investment.
Figure 4(a) shows the average ratio κ of all simulated
random type groupings with different average storage costs θ¯.
Different curves correspond to different penetration levels of
solar energy generations, where level 0 means no solar energy,
level 1 means the solar energy in the data set, and level 2
doubles the solar energy in the data set (which represents a
future scenario with high renewable penetration). The shaded
regions correspond to the one-standard-deviation ranges of all
simulated type groupings. Based on Figures 4 (a), we have the
following observations. First, Contract TS-I leads to a social
cost that is very close to the benchmark Problem ESCM, and
the average ratio κ is always below 1.015. Second, Contract
TS-I is robust among different type groupings. The standard
deviation of the ratio κ in the simulated random type groupings
is smaller than 0.005.
We define κno as the ratio between the social costs of
no storage investment and Contract TS-I. The reason for
considering the no storage investment case is that current ToU
prices in many places (e.g., most states in US [16]) are not
high enough to incentivize storage investment. Figure 4(b)
shows the average ratio κno with different average storage
costs θ¯. Different curves correspond to different penetration
levels of solar energy. The shaded regions correspond to
the one-standard-deviation ranges of all simulated random
type groupings. Compared with the ToU pricing that leads
to no storage investment in the system, Figure 4(b) shows
that Contract TS-I can significantly reduce the social cost,
especially when the renewable energy penetration level is high
and the storage cost is low. For example, when the solar
energy amount is doubled and the average storage cost is
below 15$/MWh, the social cost can be reduced by over 30%.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we design two contracts of the ToU pricing
considering the storage investment, which deals with the issue
of users’ private storage costs. Both contracts contain only
three contract items, which guides users of different storage
costs to invest in full, partial, or no storage capacity . We show
that Contract TS-C can achieve the social optimum under
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Fig. 4. Contract TS-I performance: (a) Ratio κ; (b) Ratio κno. Both
are with average storage cost θ¯ at λs = 1/3.
complete information of the aggregate demand of each type.
Via simulations based on realistic data, we show that Contract
TS-I can achieve near social optimum when the utility only
knows the demand distribution of each type.
For the future work, we plan to consider the more general
case where users’ demands can vary across days. We expect
some of our main conclusions can still hold. For example,
users will still be classified into several classes in terms of
the invested storage capacity as a function of their demands,
based on which contracts can be designed.
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